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Introduction
The expanding complexity of sub-national and cross-national threats to national security strains
the analytical capabilities of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Intelligence Community,
highlighting the need for methods and tools that can make this emergent complexity manageable.
With an ever-increasing spectrum of threats, more objective analytic capabilities that draw on
all-source intelligence and advances in computational methods are needed to help provide insight
and aid understanding of individual and group behavior.
Computer-based predictive technologies have the maturity, track record, and capability to help
meet this challenge. Just as DOD and the Intelligence Community apply computational modeling
for knowledge discovery applications, so too can computational technologies be applied to
improve the understanding of human behavior and decisionmaking. Moreover, the approach
described in this paper relies not on the large volume of electronic data focused on by most
computational methods, but rather provides a platform to facilitate and pool the knowledge of
subject matter experts in the Federal Government and academia. Computational modeling based
on reliable simulations of human behavior can then be applied to this information set to form the
basis for unbiased predictions of potential threats. This combination of technologies can then
form the basis for courses of action in response to a more systematic assessment of potential
threats.
This paper summarizes work utilizing the Senturion predictive analysis software at the National
Defense University (NDU). The Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at
NDU has been testing the Senturion capability since 2002, and has begun to support the
application of this new technology in DOD. In this paper, we begin by describing the
methodology underlying the software, and then provide an overview of three case studies that
used the software: a predictive analysis of the stabilization and reconstruction phase of Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the run-up to the Iraqi elections in January 2005, and the leadership
transition in Palestine following the death of Yasser Arafat.
Each of these projects tested the application of the software’s modeling technology to unfolding
events. Each analysis was performed and briefed to senior government decisionmakers well in
advance of events; the forecasts from each project tracked well with reality, often providing
counterintuitive results. The approach provides policymakers and analysts with a tool for
anticipating the outcome of complex political events that can also provide a detailed explanation
of why events may not unfold as expected with traditional means of analysis.
Senturion is a simulation capability that analyzes the political dynamics within local, domestic,
and international contexts and predicts how the policy positions of competing interests will
evolve over time. The underlying methodology relies on agent-based modeling—an approach
that applies a set of mathematical algorithms against rules that structure a simulation of the
behavior of “agents,” which in this case are the individuals and groups that influence political
outcomes. The set of rules used by Senturion synthesize several classes of political science and
microeconomic theories into a real-world decisionmaking tool for researchers and practitioners.
Rather than a statistical or probabilistic approach to predictive modeling, Senturion employs a set
of algorithms drawn from game theory, decision theory, spatial bargaining, and microeconomics.

Each theory provides a functional component for modeling how agents interact in a political
process. The Senturion methodology has been applied across diverse fields, including diplomacy,
military campaigns, economic accords and business negotiations. The simulation software yields
unique risk-mitigation benefits by anticipating and explaining outcomes and identifying courses
of action to achieve beneficial change.
Senturion helps analysts frame key political issues that either propel or impede policy objectives.
Given a particular issue, the software facilitates subject matter expert identification of the
positions of critical stakeholders on policy issues, weighs their potential influence, and assesses
the strength of their commitment or advocacy of a policy position. This subject matter expertgenerated data input captures a snapshot of the current political landscape with a high degree of
accuracy. However, the track record of analysts’ predictions is typically accurate 45 to 65
percent of the time.1 The agent-based modeling approach allows for a consistent, systematic,
significantly less-biased, and accurate analysis of the evolution of political dynamics given the
subject matter expert-generated political landscape. Halal and Bojes (2005) conducted a survey
of experts in the field of forecasting to determine which methodologies are more useful and
accurate in applied forecasting. Among the algorithms Senturion relies on as rules for the
behavior of its agents, the survey identified many to be valuable forecasting methodologies. In
particular, the combination of expert interviews, simulation, and game theory draws upon some
of the highest-evaluated approaches to predictive analysis. Precursors to the Senturion approach
focused more on the calculation of coalitional support for different policy alternatives, as
opposed to a dynamic model that simulates the interaction of individuals and groups over time.2
Stakeholder Analyses
Politics has often been called the “art of the possible.” If economics is the study of the
distribution of scarce resources, then politics is the competition for the rules that govern the
distribution of those scarce resources. Ultimately, these possibilities are created and constrained
by individual, groups, nation-states and their interactions. In the 1960s, work in the field of
business and management on understanding how individuals influence outcomes led to
stakeholder analyses.3 Political issues at the policy level might encompass U.S. policy in a
particular country or region, budgetary allocations in Congress, national autonomy, wars of
liberation, troop deployments, or even pipeline placement—any question that is fundamentally
determined by the interaction of people.
Traditional stakeholder analysis has relied on qualitative assessments of stakeholder preferences
as the basis for predictions of how stakeholders are likely to behave in forming coalitions in
favor of or in opposition to political issues. Senturion relies on identifying primary, secondary,
and tertiary stakeholders who have an interest in propelling or impeding various political
outcomes. Once stakeholders are identified by subject matter experts, they are categorized by
their ability to influence outcomes and the importance of political issues to them. This
categorization characteristically translates into matrix mapping with four typologies:
1

See Rieber (2004).
2 For a review see Feder (1987) and Kugler and Feng (1997).
3 Stakeholder refers to persons, institutions, agencies, private sector groups, governments, non-state actors, or other
entities with a stake in the outcome, or more importantly, some potential to influence a particular outcome.
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•
•
•
•

Large influencers with high importance who can either help or impede progress.
Opponents should be isolated, while proponents should be empowered to form larger
coalitions.
Large influencers with little importance who can be mobilized to assist the political
process if they support it, or blocked if they oppose it.
Small influencers with high importance who can either help or impede progress.
Opponents should be isolated, while proponents should be empowered in stronger
coalitions.
Small influencers with little importance who could be motivated to assist the political
process, if necessary, but would not be worth the effort to block.

Other methodologies attempt to aggregate specific stakeholder interests or scale their influence
or importance. But these approaches lack a dynamic, analytical component that allows observers
to know what will happen over time. This traditional stakeholder analysis may enlighten, but it
does not answer the key operational question, “what’s next?”
Work in the 1970s resulted in a more formal specification of the stakeholder approach, deriving
the particular political issue as a linear continuum that stakeholders fight on with a consistent set
of data inputs in the Prince System.4 Thus, stakeholders were assigned particular influence,
importance, and positional attributes that could be scaled to arrive at a relative ranking of
political viability but not actual political outcomes. The reality of most political processes is that
stakeholders exert influence to shape the dynamics of outcomes based on interactions with each
other.5 Tracking these dynamics and capturing the knowledge to achieve a desired outcome is a
complex process. One approach suggests employing vectors in static form to anticipate
stakeholder bargaining dynamics.6 Such solutions are relatively straightforward in dyadic
interactions but become less predictable in multiple-actor environments. Worse, analysts are
forced to simplify and aggregate stakeholders into larger, coarser groups to reach any
conclusions, often missing important details. This is further complicated when multiple political
issues are present.7 Combining traditional stakeholder analysis with recent advances in agentbased modeling allows for the accurate and rich simulation of all stakeholders on a particular
political issue.
Methodology
Over the last thirty years, a large, multidisciplinary literature on the simulation of individual and
group behavior on political issues has emerged and, more recently, proliferated.8 Approaches in
this field typically focus on agents at the micro level (individuals or small groups) as the unit of
analysis. The simulation technology used by Senturion models the behavior and interaction of
decisionmakers (such as individuals, families, and firms) within a larger system. This modeling
4

For a review of the PRINCE System see Coplin and O’Leary (1972).
For more detail see Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and (1985).
6 For more detail an initial notion of applying vectors to stakeholder analysis see Lalman (1988).
7 This notion is explored in more technical detail in Morrow (1986), Morgan (1994), and Abdollahian and
Alsharabati (1995) and (2003).
8 The literature here is rather broad. A sample can be found in Axtell, Axelrod, Epstein, and Cohen (1996); Epstein
and Axtel (1996); Chwe (1999); and Axlerod and Tesfatsion (2005).
5
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strategy uses data on representative samples of decisionmakers, along with equations and
algorithms representing behavioral processes, to simulate the evolution through time of each
decisionmaker, hence, of the entire population of decisionmakers.9
Whereas the computational capacity of thirty years ago allowed the simulation of only very
limited numbers of agents, or stakeholders, today’s computational power allows for sophisticated
rule sets to be applied to thousands of agents simultaneously. The stakeholder model embedded
in Senturion—which is technically an agent-based model, because agents are interacting within a
system of rules—transcends traditional stakeholder approaches by providing a consistent and
systematic modeled framework for the exponentially increasing network of interactions without
reduction or simplification in problem fidelity. For a given political issue, Senturion simulates
the iterative political decisionmaking calculus among stakeholders with different interests in and
varying influence on the political process. With considerable accuracy, it can predict how these
bargaining dynamics play out across a network of political relations over time. The result is an
analytical assessment of the likely extent of reform and of the degree of stakeholder support for
this outcome a priori without reliance on an ad hoc assessment.
Beginning with a rigorous subject matter expert-led data collection process, one can obtain a
detailed depiction of the current political landscape. In the data-collection process, stakeholders
are assigned multiple attributes of their political position and potential influence. This is
followed by an assessment of the amount of political, economic, social, and military capital they
are willing to expend on the issue. Thus, all agents are not created equal de novo. They possess
unique and individual capabilities that help determine their interactions with other agents. All
agents are subject to the same push and pull of the political process, trying to maximize their
available resources to support or oppose a particular outcome. Senturion views all agents as
attempting to maximize their interests and seeking to create coalitions to support those interests.
Senturion’s rule- and equation-based algorithms model the intuition behind each stakeholder’s
political calculus by breaking the process into sub-elements that can be modeled. Each element
models a particular part of the decision process; by combining the elements sequentially, the
approach can provide an assessment and explanation of how stakeholders arrive at a particular
decision or political outcome. Each sub-element of the modeling process is designed to help
predict a part of how stakeholder positions will change and thus predict the evolution of the
policy process in toto. From an analytical perspective, dynamic and recursive estimation of
stakeholder interactions allows Senturion to anticipate compromises and coalitions that will form
in response to political pressures. The end result is a simulation capability that provides both a
forecast and a detailed explanation and justification for its predictions. (See figure 1 for a
conceptual overview of Senturion’s sub-element rules).

9

See Caldwell (1997).
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2. Agent Based Rules & Modeling Elements

1. Initial Stakeholder Data

Effective Power

(Influence*Importance)

High

1.

What is winning coalition or Median
position?

2.

Given the winning coalition position,
which groups are risk taking?

3.

How does each stakeholder view every
other stakeholder on assisting or
opposing the issue?

4.

Which stakeholders will make what
proposals to other stakeholders,
strengthening or weakening coalitions?

5.

Which stakeholders will revise their
position on the issue resulting in
anticipating the political dynamics?

Low

4. Modeling Iteration 2

3. Anticipated Dynamics

Effective Power

(Influence*Importance)

High

1.

How did Median position change?

2.

How did risk profiles change given the
change in the median position?

3.

How do stakeholder perceptions
change?

4.

Which stakeholders will make what
proposals to other stakeholders given
these changes?

5.

Which stakeholders will revise their
position on the reform issue resulting in
anticipating the political dynamics?

Low

6. Interpreting Outcomes

5. Anticipated Outcome

Effective Power

(Influence*Importance)

High

1.

Iterations stop when stakeholders see
no further gains in discussions.

2.

Where key stakeholders end up on the
issue determines the anticipated issue
outcome.

3.

If a majority of stakeholders coalesce
around a position, there is a large
degree of consensus, if not conflict will
occur.

Low

Figure 1. Six Steps of the Senturion Modeling Process
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Senturion can provide a consistent framework for objective analysis of stakeholder politics,
rather than relying solely on individual expert opinions about political outcomes. Of course,
analytical transformations cannot compensate for poor data. The reliance on stakeholder data—
crucial to understanding human behavior and stakeholder motivations—limits the temporal
forecast horizon to approximately two years, as certain data elasticities can propagate error over
time. In other words, the likelihood of exogenous shocks over the stakeholder list increases over
time, and after two years becomes quite high. That said, Senturion allows the analyst to examine
political dynamics to, first, gauge whether the policy options are politically feasible as designed
and, second, identify tactics to shape the political environment and achieve a more favorable
outcome. Senturion can thus provide an assessment of multiple courses of action with a higher
degree of confidence then previously available.
Having described the methodology underlying Senturion, let us turn now to a description of three
recent applications.

6

Case Study 1: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Aftermath
This section summarizes the findings of an analysis focused on stability and regime change in
Iraq. The analysis for this case study began in November 2002, while the focus of the project
was on the scenario that evolved several months later, following OIF, in 2003 and 2004.
Senturion was used to simulate the interactions between all stakeholders who influence Iraq’s
stability, forecasting the consequences for the survival of Saddam’s regime and the post-Saddam
period. At each stage of the analysis, the software accurately forecasted, in detail, the outcome
and consequences of policy decisions regarding the U.S. military campaign in Iraq and the
subsequent efforts at Iraqi reconstruction. While Senturion did a good job of anticipating the
behavior of stakeholders inside Iraq, it did a poor job of anticipating the behavior of stakeholders
in Europe. In general, Senturion overestimated the willingness of European stakeholders to
support U.S.-led operations. While the core of the study was on Iraqi behavior, this is an
important lesson learned from the case study. These inaccuracies seem to be a reflection of the
level of detail applied to the data for stakeholders in Europe. For example, France and Germany
were both treated as single stakeholders. In reality, the leaderships of both countries were
stakeholders operating subject to domestic political constraints and concerns that affected their
ability and willingness to provide support for the U.S. Thus, if the intent was to more accurately
model the behavior of different coalition partners, then the stakeholder data for those potential
partners should be of sufficient depth and granularity to capture the constraints they face.
All analysis was based on data provided by Iraqi subject matter experts from the Brookings
Institution, RAND Corporation, and the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National
Defense University. All forecasts were based on unclassified information. Updates were applied
when stakeholders were captured or killed, for example, when Ali Hasan Al-Majid and Abid
Hamid Hamud were captured,10 Uday and Qusay Hussein were killed,11 and Saddam Hussein
was captured. Each new simulation, or forecast, relied on the predicted positions from the
previous simulation to create a succession of simulations over a year and a half.
Based on the aftermath of OIF in April 2003, we predicted that the situation in Iraq would
worsen throughout 2003 and 2004 in terms of Iraqi attitudes toward U.S. presence as well as
insurgent activity. While the Senturion simulation indicated that OIF would produce a quick
regime change, Saddam’s well-trained former military core was expected to provide the basis for
violent and persistent resistance. We anticipated that this resistance would receive broad and
growing political support from numerous and otherwise opposing factions within Iraq. Initial
Shiite neutrality to the United States was expected to evolve into active hostility for important
factions, including al-Sadr. Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi dissident during the Saddam regime who
was sponsored by the United States in post-war Iraq, was not expected to be a reliable ally for
the United States over time. Continued U.S. military presence was expected to unify many
10 Ali Hasan Al-Majid and Abid Hamid Hamud were two key leaders in Saddam’s regime. Thus, we wanted to
ensure that their capture would not have an appreciable change on the simulation, as they were commonly perceived
as key stakeholders. Their removal did not appear to make a significant difference.
11 Uday and Qusay Hussein, Saddam’s sons, were similarly important stakeholders in his regime. Again, we wanted
to update the simulation to reflect their death to ensure that the removal of such key stakeholders would not
substantively impact the simulation. Their removal did not appear to make a significant difference.
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Sunnis and Shiites against a common foe, the U.S. military forces on the ground. While these
findings have become a more generally accepted explanation of events after the fact, there was
substantial disagreement about the likely course of events as predicted by the Senturion
simulation prior to OIF.

Operation
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US interests
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Sunnis will
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activities will
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• Prospect for
open internal
war is high
and imminent

• Chalabi will
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operate as a
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activities
• Opposition to
US from Iraqi
civil society will
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• Terrorist
activities will
increase with
broadening
support
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• Proposed
government
structures will not
find consensus
• Implementation
of new
government will
be thwarted by
competing
parties
• Disposition of
Iraqis toward the
US will
deteriorate
• Al Sadr will
become an active
opponent of US
interests

20
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The former Iraqi regular army was expected to become an active opponent of the United States.
The Kurds were expected to briefly oppose U.S. interests, but in the end renew their support for
U.S. operations in Iraq. After the transfer of power on June 30, 2003, the model predicted that
the French and Russians increasingly would oppose U.S. interests in Iraq. Finally, the overall
level of violence in Iraq was not expected to diminish. Figure 2 shows the dates and content of
the four Senturion forecasts.

• Saddam’s capture
does not change
the predictions
• Removal of
Saddam will cause
Shiite groups to
oppose US
interests more
vigorously
• Removal of
Saddam solidifies
widespread violent
opposition to the
US

Figure 2. Track Record of Senturion Predictions on Iraq
Based on Senturion results, Saddam’s inner circle was not expected to defect in the face of a U.S.
military campaign or subsequent U.S. operations. The removal of Ali Hasan Al-Majid and Abid
Hamid Hamud, two key leaders in Saddam’s regime, as well as Saddam’s sons, Qusay and Uday,
was not expected to reduce the commitment of these stakeholders. Most importantly, the capture
of Saddam was not expected to change these results.
The Internal Security Services, Special Security Organization, Tikriti mafia, and Special
Republican Guard were well-trained and well-armed military personnel known to be extremely
loyal to Saddam. From the first prediction, these groups were expected to form the core of an
armed and violent resistance to U.S. operations and efforts in Iraq. Subsequent predictions and
adjustments have reinforced this initial finding.
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Sunni and Shiite factions were also examined to determine their likely response to the U.S.
presence in Iraq. Sunni clan leaders always were expected to oppose the United States, providing
support for the violent opposition to U.S. operations during and after OIF. The Sunni middle
class, on the other hand, were expected to take more of a “wait and see” approach to the United
States after formal military operations, and begin more vocal opposition to the U.S. activities in
mid-2003. The Sunni masses were expected to remain neutral much longer, but would begin to
voice mildly negative concerns in early 2004. After a brief period of support following the
formal end of military operations, secular and urban Shiites were expected to oppose the United
States by mid-2003. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and other southern Shiites were expected to remain
neutral, while al-Sadr was expected to become a vocal opponent in early 2004. Most importantly,
Sunni and Shiite opponents of U.S. military presence were expected to collaborate against U.S.
forces. Note that this forecast was made months prior to the onset of military hostilities.
Two additional stakeholders were added to the simulation in August 2003: the Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC) and Ahmed Chalabi. Chalabi was forecasted to be only a temporary ally of the
United States. The IGC, on the other hand, was expected to be a consistent advocate of U.S.
activities based on its close ties to the United States.
Senturion simulations provided detailed forecasts regarding how stability and regime change in
Iraq would unfold as a consequence of OIF and subsequent actions. The model produced very
specific predictions about the behavior of individual stakeholders and accurately captured the
timing of unexpected defections as well as the potential support from unexpected allies.12 As an
experiment in applying Senturion to an unfolding political situation, our test was a success, as
judged by assessments by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Office of Secretary of
Defense (OSD).13 With only limited access to subject matter experts, robust analytic results were
produced.

12 For example, the specific behavior of al Sistani, al Sadr, and other Shia stakeholders following the collapse of the
regime of Saddam was anticipated—to the point of even accurate sequencing of defections among different factions.
Similarly, the reaction of Sunnis to the aftermath of OIF in the simulation tracked very closely to observed behavior.
13 These assessments were documented in detail in Predictive Analysis Pre-Select Business Case produced by the
Research and Requirements unit of the DIA on February 7, 2005.
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Case Study 2: Iraqi Elections, January 2005
This section details the findings from a second analysis on Iraq, using only open-source data
from subject matter experts from the Intelligence Community and Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. This project focused on support for the January 2005 elections in Iraq. Once again,
all findings and predictions in this briefing were generated using Senturion only. The largely
pessimistic forecast for the elections held up well when compared to the actual flow of events.
Table 1 summarizes all of the predictions based on data collected by the end of December 2004
and compares them to actual events that unfolded over the following two months.
Focusing on the various social factions within Iraq, Senturion provided insights into the likely
behavior of Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds. The largely Sunni insurgents were expected to continue the
scope and pace of attacks against supporters of the January 30, 2005 election. On the other hand,
Iraqi supporters of the election, including secular Shia and Sistani’s followers, would maintain
their support for and participation in the election. The Sadrists were likely to lean in favor of the
election over the next few weeks, but ultimately be indecisive about their support for the process.
Groups neutral toward the election at the end of December 2004, including secular Sunni, the
Tribal Elders, and Turkomans, were expected to remain neutral. The Kurds were in general
expected to continue to support the election strongly; the PUK would be much more supportive
and cooperative with Interim Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi and the interim government than the
KDP.14 Despite their mutual support for the 30 January election, tension between the Kurds and
Shia was expected to remain high. Indeed, this tension is more pronounced than between Kurds
and Sunnis. Finally, Senturion predicted that a change of approach that made neutral Iraqis feel
safer, by either coalition forces or the insurgency, would have allowed either the U.S. or
insurgents to gain the support of neutral Iraqis.
Another major question facing analysts and decisionmakers before the election was the role that
other nations in the region might play. Senturion was also able to calculate both the desires and
effectiveness of those stakeholders in driving the election. According to the Senturion software,
Iran would attempt to drive the election, but have very little success in shaping the electoral
outcome. Syrian stakeholders would have very little influence on the election. However, the U.S.
(with a direct approach) was in a position to persuade the Syrian regime, Old Guard, and
intelligence services to support the election with a direct request for their backing—but Syrian
President Bashar al-Asad would not cooperate with such a request. Saudi Arabian and Jordanian
stakeholders were expected to have very little influence on Iraqi attitudes. Finally, while
Jordanian stakeholders would have little direct influence on the election, its support for the
election would indirectly solidify the support of Shia tribal elements.

14

The two leading Kurdish groups in Iraq are the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani, and the
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), led by Massoud Barzani.
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Predictions
(Based on 12/30/2004 Data)

Actual Events

Date of Actual
Event

Insurgents will continue scope and pace of
attacks.

Repeated attacks by insurgents continued
through the elections.

1/31/200515

Strong supporters of the elections,
particularly Sistani’s followers and secular
Shia, will participate in the election.

Sistani’s supporters and secular Shia voted in
large numbers in the election.

2/1/200516

Sadrists will be indecisive about supporting
the election despite positive signs during
January.

Sadrists straddle both sides of the election
issue, neither boycotting nor actively
opposing the election, but also not endorsing
the process.

1/31/200517

Secular Sunnis and Sunni tribal elders will
remain neutral toward the election.

Sunnis disproportionately stayed home during
the election, while not actively opposing the
process.

2/1/200518

Kurds will strongly support the election.

Kurds turned out for the election in large
numbers.

2/1/200519

Tension will remain high between Kurds and
Shia.

Tension between Kurds and Shia on future of
Iraq appears to remain high despite the
election.

1/31/200520

Zarqawi and foreign insurgents will have
little success in undermining support for
election in January.

Election went forward with high Shia
participation, despite attacks by insurgents.

2/1/200521

World Bank and IMF will pull back support
of the election.

Timing and willingness of World Bank and
IMF reconstruction efforts in Iraq unclear.

1/28/200522

France, Russia, and Germany will
increasingly support the election.

France and Germany praise the Iraqi election.
Russian response ambiguous.

2/2/200523

Table 1. Track Record of Iraqi Election Predictions

15

Washington Times, Jan 31, 2005.
Washington Post, Feb 1, 2005.
17 New York Times, Jan 31, 2005.
18 Washington Times, Feb 1, 2005.
19 Washington Times, Feb 1, 2005.
20 Christian Science Monitor, Jan 31, 2005.
21 Washington Post, Feb 1, 2005.
22 Washington Post, Jan 28, 2005.
23 International Herald Tribune, Feb 2, 2005.
16
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Senturion also was used to assess the reactions to the election of major players in the
international community. France, Russia, and Germany were expected to coalesce and
increasingly support the election, but their impact would be minimal on Iraqi attitudes. Poland,
South Korea, and Australia would continue to strongly support the election with limited impact
on Iraqi attitudes. Turkey, Ukraine, Egypt, and Japan would also remain supportive of the
election. Finally, the World Bank and IMF were expected to quickly pull back their explicit
support for the election.
In assessing the insurgency in Iraq, Senturion provided two startling conclusions. As for foreign
insurgents, Senturion forecasted that Zarqawi and other foreign insurgents had very little
leverage to undermine support for the election at this point. On the other hand, domestic
insurgents, composed mainly of former regime elements, had most of the leverage in this
situation in the months before the election. However, they did not recognize the extent of their
potential influence. As long as the highly-trained factions of the former regime elements focused
indiscriminately on targets in Iraq, they missed out on an opportunity to capture the support of
neutral Iraqis. Were the former regime elements to shift their tactics and focus solely on coalition
forces and their closest allies, they would maximize their leverage and better achieve their goal
of minimizing support for the election. Such a shift by the insurgents would have undermined the
resolve of the coalition to push forward on the elections and solidified the support of neutral
Iraqis for the insurgency by making them feel safer. We cannot assess the accuracy of this
finding because the former regime elements did not exploit this opportunity.
Senturion also can be used to test alternative courses of action. The assumptions, policies, and
tactics of U.S. stakeholders can be simulated to identify first- and second-order consequences,
then adjusted to find the optimal approach to a particular situation. Moreover, because Senturion
calculates the perceptions of stakeholders, it can also identify circumstances when perceptions of
key stakeholders are inaccurate. At times, such knowledge may form the basis for a course of
action to exploit the limits of perception. Several courses of action to improve the situation in
Iraq prior to the election were identified using Senturion, as described below.
First, Senturion identified a way to persuade Sunni tribal elements to moderate their opposition
to the election. Initially, Interim Prime Minister Allawi and the interim government would have
needed to alter their approach to the Sunni tribes and focus on persuading the youth element in
the Sunni tribes. The youths could have been offered a modest monetary incentive to take a
neutral stance toward the elections. After this accomplishment, the Sunni tribal elders could have
been approached to actively support the elections (as the tribes would not have been split if the
elders had accepted such an offer at that point). In a truly tribal structure, the elders decide on the
course of the tribe and the youth will follow. However, no individuals make decisions without
observing the sentiment and preferences of those around them. In this case, the model indicated
that the elders were weakly committed to their initial course of action and could have been
persuaded by the opinions of tribal youths, which in turn could have been influenced by U.S.
strategic messaging or an information operation campaign.
Second, we identified a way to obtain support from some former regime elements. Specifically,
Senturion analysis suggested that rank and file former regime elements could have been
persuaded to participate in the election if directly approached by Interim Prime Minister Allawi
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with U.S. backing. More senior and better trained former regime elements were not expected to
respond to such an approach. These two measures would not have lessened the insurgency, but
according to the Senturion simulation, they could have increased Sunni participation in the
election.
Finally, Senturion was used to assess the implication of adjusting the force structure in Iraq
before the election. A reduced coalition military presence in Iraq would not have appreciably
affected the attitudes of Iraqi stakeholders. However, increased coalition military strength in Iraq
would have improved the attitudes of Iraqi stakeholders toward the election by making them feel
more secure. We tested a variety of different options for the composition of military forces, as
well as the level of percentage increase in forces on the ground necessary to impose the peace.
The scenarios tested included the following, with the associated impact of each increase in boots
on the ground:
•
•
•

25% increase in coalition military strength would have captured the support of neutral
Iraqis.
50% increase in coalition military strength would have captured the support of neutral
and some opposing Iraqis.
75-100% increase in coalition military strength would have captured the support of
neutral Iraqis, but with less gain in support than with a 50% increase.

After testing the impact of greater numbers of troops, we also tested whether the population
would be sensitive to the composition of enhanced deployments, that is, would it make a
different if the troops were composed of strictly U.S. forces or a combination with other allied
forces. The Senturion analysis indicated that the composition of U.S. versus other coalition
troops did not make a difference in perceptions of the Iraqi population. However, there was a
difference when testing the perception of using United Nations peacekeepers in place of U.S.
troops, in that they could play a similar peacekeeping and policing role to that of U.S. or
coalition military forces, but because of the perceptions of Iraqis, could accomplish the same
results with fewer troops.
The final set of Senturion simulations focused on scenarios that might have disrupted progress
toward elections. In particular, we found that the assassination of al Sistani, al Sadr, or Allawi
would not have disrupted support for or opposition to the election. The finding on al Sistani was
a dramatic change from earlier findings on his role in Iraq. Over the course of the analyses in
2003 and 2004 as described above, al Sistani played a major stabilizing role, and his death would
have caused even greater instability. However, during the final run-up to the election, he had
clearly declared his support for the U.S.-led elections. By no longer occupying a neutral role, the
important stabilizing role previously played by al Sistani was diminished. Similarly, removal of
Zarqawi was unlikely to disrupt the insurgents or affect support for the election. Finally, a
targeted reduction of former regime element capability would have had little or no impact on
support for the election.
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Case Study 3: Palestinian Leadership Transition after
Yasser Arafat’s Death
These results are drawn from a study analysis for the DIA on the leadership transition in
Palestine following the death of Arafat and its impact on the Palestinian-Israeli peace
negotiations. Unclassified data were collected from subject matter experts in the Intelligence
Community on November 2, 2004, immediately following Arafat’s death and prior to the
consolidation of power in Palestine. Table 2 summarizes the track record of these predictions.
Predictions
(Based on 11/2/2004 Data)

Actual Events

Date of Actual
Event

Fatah old guard will quickly support Mazen.

15-member Central Committee endorses
Mazen.

11/23/200424

Mazen will quickly persuade Qaddumi and
Dahlan to lend their support.

Both Qaddumi and Dahlan endorse Mazen as
President of the Palestinian Authority.

11/22/200425

Mazen expected to work with Dahlan and
Musa Arafat, arranging power sharing
accommodations with each.

Dahlan and Musa Arafat reconcile their
violent differences under the guidance of
Mazen and lend their support.

11/21/200426

Israel and Europe expected to accept Mazen’s
leadership role.

Mazen is the favored choice of Israel and
Europe for Palestinian leadership.

11/24/200427

After most have declared support for Mazen,
the AAMB will lend its support.

AAMB factions issued a joint statement
calling for Palestinians to support Mazen.

11/28/200428

Barghouti endorses Mazen.

11/26/200429

Barghouti enters presidential race.

12/1/200430

Barghouti withdraws from presidential race.

12/12/200431

Barghouti not expected to oppose Mazen—
risk of opposition alliance with Hamas or
AAMB.

Table 2. Track Record of Palestinian Leadership Transition Predictions

24

Washington Post, Nov 23, 2004.
Arabic Media Network, Nov 22, 2004.
26 Jerusalem Post, Nov 21, 2004.
27 The Guardian, Nov 24, 2004.
28 BBC News, Nov 28, 2004.
29 United Press International, Nov 26, 2004.
30 Jerusalem Post, Dec 2, 2004.
31 BBC News, Dec 12, 2004.
25
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Senturion accurately anticipated that Abu Mazen (a name applied to Mahmoud Abbas as a sign
of respect) would be accepted as a political leader by the Presidential election in January 2005.
Despite initial wide variance in the level of support from Palestinian stakeholders, as well as
initial opposition by several militant groups within Palestine, all opposition to his leadership role
was expected to erode.
Senturion predicted a consolidation of Palestinian support for Mazen through leadership powersharing arrangements. Of those supporting Mazen, most were expected to support his leadership
around the position of Abu Ala (also known as Ahmed Ali Mohammed Qurei, a member of the
Fatah Central Committee). Mazen was expected to soften his claims to leadership first in
response to Mohammed Dahlan (member of the Palestinian Legislative Council), and then in
response to Musa Arafat (nephew of Yasser Arafat), implying some sort of power-sharing
accommodation with each.
Protracted opposition by armed groups was not expected. Mazen was expected to quickly
persuade the Fatah hardliners, Faruq al-Qaddumi (interim chairman of the Fatah32), and Musa
Arafat to support him. A year later, in September 2005, Musa Arafat was murdered, but during
the course of the Palestinian election, Senturion correctly anticipated relative calm among these
political figures. Hamas and the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB)33 were anticipated to
respond to this consolidation by softening their level of opposition. Over time, the Senturion
analysis indicated that both the AAMB and Hamas would realize they must support Mazen or
risk being isolated from all other stakeholders.
The major risk to this consolidation of power was the formation of an alliance between Marwan
Barghouti (a leader of the Fatah movement imprisoned in Israel) and more extreme opponents of
Mazen. In the early stages of Mazen’s consolidation of support, immediately after Arafat’s death,
Senturion found that either AAMB or Hamas had the potential to bring Barghouti into an
opposition coalition. Such a coalition would have posed the risk of a violent transition, as some
of its members had previously relied on violence to express their opposition. However, this
coalition was considered unlikely to form, as the AAMB and others were not expected to
consider it workable.
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of effective power (influence weighted by importance) in
support of particular positions, so that the strength of various coalitions can be easily identified.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of power as of 2 November, 2004, and indicates a wide variety of
positions supported by stakeholders. This indicated very little consensus regarding the choice of
Mazen as the next Palestinian leader.

32 At the time of this study, and even today to a lesser extent, Fatah was the major political party in Palestine. Fatah
is the reverse acronym from the Arabic name Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini (literally: "Palestinian National
Liberation Movement"), and it is the largest organization within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a
multi-party confederation. Thus, it was important for Abu Mazen to obtain the support of Fatah.
33 The Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades are a Palestinian armed terrorist group closely linked to the Fatah party. It is often
considered the radical militant arm of Fatah, although the ties between the organizations are not entirely clear. This
militia was originally named after the Al Aqsa Mosque, one of Islam's holiest sites and an icon for the Palestinian
movement.
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AAMB Musa Arafat
Hezbollah

Egypt
Israeli Left
Barghouti

Israeli Right
Fatah Hardliners
Qaddumi
Hamas

US (Pro-Israeli Right)

PFLP

US (Pro-Israeli Right)
Fatah Reformers
Abu Ala
Jordan
Abu Mazen
Europeans
Dahlan

Figure 3. Current Situation - Distribution of Stakeholder Advocated Positions in Support of or in
Opposition to Abu Mazen
Figure 4, on the other, hand, reflects the distribution of effective power after the passage of
several political interactions. This figure indicates that, over time, Mazen will consolidate
support of all stakeholders. However, since all stakeholders have coalesced around a position
less extreme than complete support of Mazen as Palestinian leader, we infer that he will
accommodate others within the leadership and has agreed to some sort of power-sharing
arrangement—while still taking the lead role in his coalition.

Israeli Right

Fatah Hardliners
Qaddumi
AAMB

Abu Mazen
Abu Ala
Dahlan
Barghouti
Qaddumi
Fatah Reformers
Hezbollah
PFLP
Foreign Stakeholders

Figure 4. Predicted Situation (Round 8 of simulation, approximately 10-14 weeks)
Distribution of Stakeholder Advocated Positions in Support of or in Opposition to Abu Mazen
Figures 5 and 6 provide a round-by-round view of the position shifts of stakeholders, based on
the Senturion calculations. According to a tracking of actual events, as documented in Table 2,
these predictions proved to be uniformly accurate. While the software takes into consideration
the influence of all stakeholders to more clearly identify changes in stakeholder positions over
time, figure 5 depicts only Palestinian positions and figure 6 depicts only the positions of foreign
stakeholders.
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Figure 5 indicated that, of those supporting Mazen, most would consolidate their position around
Abu Ala, Barghouti, and the Fatah Reformers. Mazen is persuaded to soften his claims to
leadership first in response to Dahlan, and then in response to Musa Arafat, suggesting some sort
of accommodation with each.

Full Support
for Abu Mazen
as Leader

Dahlan

Fatah Reformers
Abu Ala
Barghouti

Abu Mazen

Neutral
toward Abu Mazen
as Leader

Full Opposition
toward Abu Mazen
as Leader

PFLP

Hamas Fatah Hardliners
Qaddumi

Musa Arafat

AAMB

Figure 5. Prediction of 8 Rounds of Stakeholder Position Shifts
Position Shifts of Palestinian Stakeholders’ Support of or Opposition to Abu Mazen
At the other end of the spectrum, stakeholders opposed to Mazen were persuaded to lend their
support to his leadership. Mazen was able to persuade the Fatah Hardliners, Qaddumi, and Musa
Arafat to support him in the second round of the simulation. Hamas and the AAMB responded to
this consolidation by increasing their level of support for him. In the third round, Hamas was
persuaded by the new Palestinian leadership coalition to back Mazen. The AAMB, initially the
most ardent opponent of Mazen, then had to make concessions or risk being isolated from all
other stakeholders. Thus, even the AAMB was persuaded by Mazen and then Musa Arafat to
support the coalition.
Figure 6 provides a summary of expected position shifts for international stakeholders.
Barghouti’s support for Mazen appeared to be important for validating the Mazen coalition in the
eyes of foreign opponents, including such disparate stakeholders as the Israeli Right, Hezbollah,
Iran, and Syria. As with the Palestinian stakeholders, all stakeholders came to support the Mazen
coalition after several rounds of the simulation exercise.
AAMB, according to Senturion, was a critical stakeholder in the evolution of support for Mazen.
In the early stages of Mazen’s consolidation of support, the AAMB and other opponents had the
potential to bring Barghouti into a prospective opposition coalition. Such a coalition would have
raised the risk of a violent transition, as some of its members had previously expressed their
opposition through violence.
However, Senturion indicated that AAMB was unlikely to realize the potential success of such
an initiative. If they, or other more extreme opponents of Mazen, realized the viability of such a
coalition, the result was likely to be entrenched and potentially violent opposition to his
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leadership coalition—preventing the consolidation of support from any of his more extreme
opponents.

Full Support
for Abu Mazen
as Leader

Jordan
US Pro-Isareali Left
Europeans/UN
Israeli Left
Egypt
US Pro-Israeli Right

Neutral
toward Abu Mazen
as Leader

Full Opposition
toward Abu Mazen
as Leader

Israeli Right

Hezbollah
Iran/Syria

Figure 6. Prediction of 8 Rounds of Stakeholder Position Shifts
Position Shifts of International Stakeholders’ Support of or Opposition to Abu Mazen
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Conclusions
The three case studies described above demonstrate a portion of the track record of predictions
that were produced by the Senturion software. This approach could compliment traditional
analysis by allowing for the exploration of multiple permutations and iterations of analyst
assumptions within a consistent framework. Moreover, systematic and rigorous tools such as
Senturion enable analysts to generate courses of action to obtain improved outcomes and
mitigate the risk associated with uncertain approaches.
A predictive political simulation technology such as Senturion can be applied to an array of
political-military problems in near-real-time. Approaches such as Senturion are useful in the
complex field of predictive analysis because they facilitate a systematic account of stakeholder
interactions, with a reliable predictive tool to support the decisionmaking and analytic processes.
As shown in these case studies (and in all document DOD and Intelligence Community studies),
Senturion has been uncannily accurate at anticipating stakeholder behavior. However, the greater
aid that the tool offers is in providing analysts and decisionmakers with an alternative and
systematic view of the decisionmaking process. By keeping track of and simulating stakeholder
behavior in a systematic fashion, Senturion is able to identify subtle dynamics between
stakeholders that might not otherwise be apparent. The combination of these subtle behaviors
produces a rich, detailed view of stakeholder dynamics that in turn provides a capability that can
be used to help test hypotheses and often produce counter intuitive results. Combined with
subject matter expert input, Senturion provides a visualization and forecast of evolving political
environments that can be adjusted in real time to see varying results and implications for
differing courses of action. While analytical tools will never replace the human analyst,
Senturion can help leverage analysts’ time to produce more accurate and actionable assessments
of complex political-military situations.
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